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In the summer of 2004, Greece will host the Olympic Games.  Americans attending the games 
and visiting traditional tourist stops in Athens are sure to be greeted with open arms.  But for 
those who delve a bit further into the country-side seeking a taste of average Greek life, some are 
sure to hear some fascinating tales flavored with a strong hint of anti-Americanism.   
To many foreigners that visit Greece these days, it might seem like the cradle of 
democracy is also the cradle of conspiracy.  Take these schemes, for example: (1) Orthodox 
Serbs, not Muslims, were the true victims of the slaughters in the Balkans during the 1990s—and 
the primary reason that NATO intervened was so that the United States could establish a military 
foothold there;1 (2) the U.S. Ambassador played a tacit role in the removal of the Secretary-
General of Greece’s ruling political party;2 and (3) the attack on the World Trade Center was a 
joint Jewish-American conspiracy to justify a Western war against Muslims—with reports that 
no Jews died in the September 11 attacks.3  All of these perspectives have numerous subscribers 
in Greece.  This should come as no surprise given that they have often been reported in the 
Greek media.4 
Often conspiracy theories are brushed off.  But in Greece, such conspiracy theories are no 
laughing matter as they often reinforce the anti-Americanism that pervades Greek society.  Such 
anti-Western sentiment has, in recent years, resulted in violent protests and street attacks, 
inspired domestic terrorism in Greece, and jeopardized NATO operations in the Balkans. 
The roots of anti-Americanism in Greece are many, including media irresponsibility, 
electoral opportunism, and religious dogmatism.5  But perhaps the strongest root has been 
American foreign policy toward Greece during the Cold War—particularly policy leading up to 
the establishment of a dictatorship in 1967.  
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On April 21, 1967, a military junta of Greek Army colonels staged a successful coup 
d’etat that suppressed the rule of law and democracy for seven years.6  Domestically, Greeks 
were subjected to martial law—often exiled, repressed, or tortured.7  Internationally, the junta 
launched a military overthrow of the democratically elected President of Cyprus, which triggered 
a Greco-Turkish war that has left the island nation divided and heavily militarized thirty years 
later.8 
All along, one of the strongest held conspiracy theories has been that the United States 
sponsored the 1967 coup.9  In other words, many Greeks have long believed that the Eagle and 
the Phoenix—respective symbols of the United States government and the Greek military 
regime—were birds of a feather.  In fact, recognizing that many Greeks accept this as true, 
President Clinton, during a 1999 visit to Athens, practically apologized for American policy 
during the 1960s and early 1970s.  “When the junta took over in 1967 here, the United States 
allowed its interests in prosecuting the Cold War to prevail over its interests—I should say its 
obligation—to support democracy, which was, after all, the cause for which we fought the Cold 
War.  It is important that we acknowledge that,” Clinton told a group of Greek businessmen.10 
Certainly, it is difficult to deny that the Nixon administration (which came to power in 
1969) supported the junta.11  But as to the equally significant question of “Did the U.S. give the 
‘green light’ to the Colonels to overthrow democracy in Greece?” a new volume of declassified 
documents and a new collection of oral histories seem to shatter the long-held Greek position 
that the Colonels were just America’s boys acting out the Johnson administration’s wishes.12   
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Prelude to the Coup 
Greece became a focal point for American attention following the end of World War II.  By 
1946, Greece was embroiled in a civil war, pitting monarchists against communists.  With the 
Cold War dawning, the United Kingdom came to the aid of the Greek monarchist forces.  Due to 
limited resources and the pressing costs of reconstruction, however, the British were forced to 
turn over their operations to the United States in 1947.  The Truman administration, perceiving 
Greece as geostrategically vital vis-à-vis the Soviet sphere, feared the possible implications of a 
communist victory.  On March 12, 1947, United States President Harry Truman delivered his 
famous Truman Doctrine speech before Congress: 
 
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.   
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their 
own way.13 
 
 
The launch of the Truman Doctrine marked the start of a two decade relationship of American 
influence on Greek democracy.  Some of the major American accomplishments in Greece 
included assistance in the defeat of communism in the Greek Civil War, incorporation of Greece 
into NATO, the establishment of U.S. military bases in Greece, the creation of military and 
security services capable of maintaining domestic security, the marginalization of the Greek left 
from the electoral system, the socialization of the Greek monarchy into a Western political agent, 
and the consolidation of the Greek political system into a stable parliamentary democracy that 
safeguarded over a decade of pro-American conservative rule.14   
In August 1953, the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, John Peurifoy, characterized American 
Cold War efforts in Greece as largely successful: 
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US leadership [in Greece] has been respected more highly and followed more 
unquestioningly than elsewhere in Europe or in most parts of the world.  This statement 
applies particularly to the present Greek Government under Marshal Papagos since its 
own unswervingly anti-Communist convictions coincide with ours and since, in our 
desire to promote political and economic stability in Greece, we exercized [sic.] our 
influence in such a way as to favor its advent to power. . . . 
[T]he Greek Government and people continue to be in full agreement with the 
main lines of US foreign policy and to be willing, indeed eager, to accept US leadership 
whenever it is proffered. . . . 
If we are able and willing to continue some support for these purposes, through a 
combination of all the various means and techniques available to us, we shall have no 
difficulty in maintaining our preeminent position and influence in Greece. . . .  
Continuing modest doses of financial support and political consideration can safeguard at 
small cost a unique US position.15 
 
 
As Peurifoy’s memorandum acknowledges, the United States, at times, pursued its 
interests in Greece with a heavy-hand.  As a result, the Greek people began to resent America’s 
“leadership.”  By December 1954, American symbols were coming under attack.16  The 
“disengagement” of the Greek people from America’s preferred course was meticulously 
discussed in 1957.  In a 15-page memorandum, James K. Penfield, a political officer at the 
American Embassy in Greece, observed: 
 
When the Greek public sees its desires with respect to Cyprus supported without stint in 
the United Nations by the Afro-Asian Bloc, by Tito, and, however tardily and 
hypocritically, by the Soviet Bloc, and sees the United States and each of its partners in 
NATO either thwart those desires or remain indifferent or neutral toward them, it lends 
an ever more receptive ear to those who in public speeches and in the daily press ask 
what Greece’s ties to the West have gained her and why she should continue to maintain 
them. . . . 
We and our policies have become less popular with the Greeks in recent years and 
months and we see no evidence of the existence of any force which will reverse this trend 
in the immediate future, barring an immediate settlement of the Cyprus issue in a manner 
satisfactory to Greece or a very large increase in the amount of American economic 
assistance.17 
 
 
The memo insisted, “We are not winning the battle for the Greek mind.”18  This led Penfield to 
conclude: 
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We are passing through a period when our influence and prestige among the Greek 
people and with the Greek Government are undergoing a reassessment and readjustment 
in a changed world situation.  We can no longer be as certain as we have been in the past 
that we shall have Greece’s support in foreign policy matters that are critical to us. . . .  
Unless [the reasons for disengagement] are corrected, however, there is a distinct 
possibility that Greece will find herself ultimately in the neutral bloc or in a “non-bloc” 
alignment where, we have reason to fear, a growing number of Greeks today are already 
finding themselves psychologically. 
We have reached a new stage in Greek-American relations in which many of our 
decade-old assumptions and rules-of-thumb are no longer valid.19 
 
 
With the United States no longer being perceived by the Greek public as the champion of 
the free world and democracy, a swing toward disengagement began.  It followed that the Greek 
right, which the United States helped bring to power, also came to be perceived in this negative 
light.  As Laurence Stern described the period, “Greek public opinion in the mid-sixties was 
running counter to the interests of the entrenched institutions of palace, army, intelligence 
service, and the counterpart American presence.”20  Representative of this growing opinion were 
George and Andreas Papandreou and their Center Union political party.   
Waging what he called an “Unyielding Struggle” against a corrupt political establishment 
that had manipulated the elections of 1961, George Papandreou, in February 1964, was elected 
Prime Minister.  Still bitter over his electoral loss in 1961, George Papandreou released 
documents that discussed the Pericles Plan (an alleged Greek covert operation to influence the 
1961 election).21  When King Constantine identified the five military officers that conducted the 
investigation of the Pericles Plan, he asked Papandreou to dismiss them.  However, George 
Papandreou refused to dismiss them.22   
In response to Papandreou’s unwillingness to appease the King, information was leaked 
to the press about an alleged plot to eliminate the Monarchy and establish a left-wing 
government.  This plot was to be carried out by a para-military group known as ASPIDA, 
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allegedly under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, George Papandreou’s son.23  George 
Papandreou, in a reaction to the ASPIDA allegations, attempted to reshuffle some senior military 
officers.  He also attempted to retire some officers, so as to replace them with younger, more 
liberal officers.  One of the officers that Papandreou tried to dismiss was the Army Chief of 
Staff, General Ioannis Gennimatas, who had been implicated in the Pericles Plan.24 
Papandreou’s Defense Minister, Petros Garoufalias, did not accept Papandreou’s military 
re-structuring scheme.  Papandreou then dismissed Garoufalias and attempted to head the 
Ministry of Defense himself.  Garoufalias refused to resign, however, without a writ from King 
Constantine.  The King did not approve of the dismissal of Garoufalias on the grounds that 
Papandreou, by making himself Defense Minister, was putting himself in charge of the 
investigation of the ASPIDA group and his son’s relationship with that group.25   
George Papandreou, who felt that the Prime Minister should be able to select his own 
cabinet, resigned on July 15, 1965.  Feeling that he had been maneuvered out of politics by the 
King, Papandreou countered by launching a second “Unyielding Struggle.”26  Elections were 
ultimately scheduled for May 28, 1967.  By mid-March 1967, many Greeks, including the King 
himself, became convinced that the Papandreous would win the May elections.  A pre-election 
CIA poll predicted that George Papandreou’s margin of victory would be greater in the 
upcoming election, than it was in 1964, when his party secured 53% of the vote.27   
In order to prevent George Papandreou’s return to power, the King planned an “extra-
parliamentary” solution, i.e., a coup, to be staged by generals loyal to the Palace.28  However, to 
the surprise of many, a group of army colonels staged a coup d’etat of their own on April 21, 
1967, circumventing the scheduled May elections and the victory of George Papandreou.29 
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The Circumstantial Evidence of American Involvement 
For the people of Greece, the military dictatorship constituted a real life Greek tragedy.  Many 
Greeks still hold the United States responsible for the events that took place on April 21, 1967.  
This section reviews the evidence that is commonly presented to implicate the United States in 
the 1967 coup.  Much like a criminal prosecution, the evidence that speaks to the intention (mens 
rea) as well as the action (actus reus) of preventing a Papandreou electoral victory is reviewed.  
Unlike a successful prosecution, though, the evidence is too circumstantial and problematic to 
support the questionable allegation of American sponsorship of the Colonels’ coup.   
 
Mens Rea 
Like any serious criminal matter, guilt requires intent.  So, did the United States have a motive 
for overthrowing democracy in Greece in 1967?30  To answer this, we must ask: Why would the 
United States want a coup d’etat to take place in Greece?  The response is: to prevent the 
Papandreous, especially Andreas Papandreou, from coming to power again.  Andreas 
Papandreou represented the new tide of public opinion that was spreading throughout Greece.  
As one observer noted, “popular reaction to his speeches became more and more enthusiastic.”31  
Polls increasingly found that he was a gaining in popularity.32 
 To many of the U.S. foreign policy representatives in Greece, Andreas Papandreou was a 
growing threat to American interests.33  The United States soon developed a paranoia concerning 
him.  For instance, new Foreign Service officers arriving in Athens were given detailed briefings 
on him.  As one U.S. diplomat told Laurence Stern: 
 
The Greek desk officer had handed me a large file folder of background material on 
Andreas prepared by the CIA which, among other things, purported to prove that he had 
been a fellow traveler if not worse for many years—since his student days—that he had 
 8
engaged in corrupt practices during his membership in his father’s government . . . that he 
was morally sinful . . . and that he was generally a most reprehensible individual who 
posed a serious danger to United States’ interests in Greece.34 
 
 
In the words of a senior American intelligence officer: 
 
There was growing concern in our embassy that in an election Papandreou would win and 
Andreas would become the dominant figure.  He had become increasingly anti-American.  
He was charging openly that Greece had lost her sovereignty to NATO which was an 
instrument of United States policy.  Greece was agitated over the Cyprus situation and 
there were many who wanted to fight the Turks more than anyone else. 
 Andreas was complaining that Greek national security requirements were being 
subordinated to NATO and American interests [and that] Greece was not able to meet its 
security requirements in Cyprus, for example, as a result of American manipulation of 
NATO.  He said NATO and Greece had become instruments of United States policy, not 
Greek policy.  He attacked the United States, KYP [the Greek Central Intelligence 
Service], and CIA. 
 The old man was now senile and if he were elected, Andreas would become more 
influential than ever.  We were increasingly concerned about the election.  We were 
concerned that if Papandreou won, Andreas would be in the driver’s seat for all practical 
purposes.  He would withdraw Greece from NATO, evacuate the United States bases, 
shut down the Communication Center at Nea Makri [a major US naval communications 
facility near Marathon].  Andreas was also charging that the Americans corrupted the 
Greek economy.  His answer would be to restrict the American presence and demand a 
high price for what remained.35 
 
 John Owens, one of the Desk Officers for Greece at the State Department in the late 
1960s, described the situation as follows: “I think Andreas upped the stakes and made it either us 
or them.  It turned into a zero sum game, so that eventually . . . he convinced the power structure 
that it was not possible for Greece to endure an eventual Andreas Papandreou government.”36  
The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in 1967, Norbert Anschuetz, felt that there was a growing 
concern that Andreas would “abolish the monarchy” and “purge the Hellenic military forces to 
his political advantage.”37  The unease was shared by the Embassy’s leadership.  According to 
the CIA Station Chief in Athens in 1967: 
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The “country team” . . . concluded that a Papandreou victory would seriously damage 
vital U.S interests in the eastern Mediterranean, weaken NATO’s southern flank and 
seriously destabilize Greek-Turkish relations, then strained by the Cyprus situation.38 
 
 
Concerns resonated back in Washington at the highest levels as well.  Former 
Undersecretary of State George Ball referred to him as “that evil Andreas.”39  Former Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson described both Papandreous as “the old fool and the young rascal.”40  
Criticism even came from President Johnson, who reportedly accused Andreas Papandreou of 
having “betrayed America.”41  Allegedly, Johnson once complained: 
  
We gave the son of a bitch American citizenship, didn’t we?  He was an American, with 
all the rights and privileges.  And he had sworn allegiance to the flag.  And then he gave 
up his American citizenship.  He went back to just being a Greek.  You can’t trust a man 
who breaks his oath of allegiance to the flag of these United States.42 
 
 
Despite such negative impressions of Andreas Papandreou, the Embassy staff did not 
signal a serious distaste for him and his politics until September 1965.  Between the time of 
George Papandreou’s resignation on July 15 through the remainder of the summer, Embassy 
personnel had avoided taking positions in the festering Greek political crisis.43  “Discretion 
needed to avoid untimely involvement of American factor” was the official instruction coming 
from Washington.44   
On September 5, 1965, however, DCM Anschuetz counseled that American interests 
would be better served if the Papandreous were not re-elected.  While most of the memo remains 
classified, a large portion the de-classified text, which marks the first official American position 
against the Papandreous, warrants reproduction here: 
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Embassy has concluded George Papandreou’s return to power should be avoided if this 
can be done without a direct and open confrontation with him. . . . 
Andreas’ motives are difficult to present categorically.  In my assessment, based 
on half dozen extensive conversations with him, Andreas is neutralist, ambitious, amoral, 
and emotionally unstable.  Although conclusive proof has not yet been adduced I believe 
Andreas is probably a leader in Aspida and that he hopes eventually to achieve a measure 
of control in army which would be exercised as decisive element in Greek political life. 
In his view the weight of the American position in Greece, political and military, 
is an obstacle to “independent” foreign and domestic Greek policy which he advocates.  I 
believe Andreas would seek significantly to reduce Greek military expenses, would 
progressively remove Greece from close NATO alignment, look increasingly toward 
Soviet bloc both as growing market for Greek products (30 per cent of Greek exports 
now find their way to the Soviet bloc) and as source of aid to fill gap created by decline 
in Western aid (U.S., OECD, NATO defense support).  His natural ally in implementing 
such a policy is extreme Left and Communists.  Explanation of his dubious role in 
Cyprus issue and his opposition to an active enosis policy may lie in his desire to avoid a 
position which would be offensive to Soviet Union and Communist elements to whom he 
seems to be looking for support in other areas.  Under these circumstances, it is of great 
importance to obtain better measure Andreas’ relationship Communists and extreme Left, 
determine sources and magnitude his financial resources, and circumscribe to extent 
possible his political power, actual and potential. 
Greece is small, poor country in strategic area of world. Gradual elimination of 
Western economic aid, reduction of East-West tensions, increased trade between Greece 
and the bloc, frustration over the Cyprus situation, and current political impasse with its 
implication for viability of regime itself have all combined create movement of new 
dimensions in postwar Greek political life.  This situation presents new opportunities for 
Soviet bloc and perhaps other unfriendly forces such as Gaullist France and Red China.  
Objective evidence such as organization of public manifestations, program of personal 
threats and intimidation, and rumors regarding substantial funds available to Andreas 
clearly suggests Communists are not standing aside.45  
 
 
As the testimonials reviewed above indicate, Andreas Papandreou, at a minimum, was 
considered a nuisance to American interests.  The fear, though, was that he could evolve into a 
serious threat.  As Anschuetz’s telegram makes clear, by the fall of 1965, American authorities 
were proposing an official anti-Papandreou foreign policy—because the potential costs of a 
Papandreou electoral victory were assessed as outweighing the potential benefits, in terms of 
American national interests.   
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In terms of motive, therefore, the United States stood to reap a potential political benefit 
from an extra-parliamentary action: the rise of Andreas Papandreou would be curtailed.46  As 
such, the United States had reason to advocate, if not help stage, the Greek coup of 1967.  And 
many Greeks would swear that it did.  But did it?  Was their action to complement the motive? 
 
Actus Reus 
There are three factors that are frequently high-lighted to suggest American blameworthiness: (1) 
the Athens Embassy favored a covert operation to prevent the Papandreous from coming to 
power; (2) the junta that staged the coup had connections to the American intelligence 
community; and (3) the U.S. military and intelligence presence in Greece did not resist the 
coup—which was likely executed via a NATO plan—on the morning it occurred.  There is 
evidence to support these propositions.  But do any of the claims prove American responsibility? 
First, as the former CIA Station Chief John Maury publicly acknowledged in 1977, the 
Embassy leadership advocated a covert operation to prevent the Papandreous from winning the 
May 1967 elections.47  The operation, decided on “reluctantly,” was “to generate enough 
political energy to oppose effectively those who would lead Greece down more dangerous 
trails.”48  Maury characterized it as “a modest covert program to support moderate candidates in 
a few ‘swing’ districts.”49  In large part, the country team was concerned with the consequences 
of Andreas Papandreou’s rise to power.  According to Ambassador Phillips Talbot, “important 
successes by Andreas could set off policy shifts away from traditional firm alliance with 
West.”50  The recommendation concluded: 
 
[The] United States has interest in maintenance in power of a Greek Government, of 
whatever party, that is committed to continued close and broad relations with United 
States, and that Andreas is the most immediate and prospectively potent factor opposing 
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this relationship. . . .  U.S. policy needs also to demonstrate sympathetic American 
support for Greek progress and stability.  This has become more difficult at stage when 
economic assistance has been phased out, military assistance is being phased down more 
rapidly than either government had foreseen, and unresolved Greek-Turkish differences 
put strains on Greek-American as well as on Turkish-American relations.  Best long-term 
answer will be found in maintaining variety of active if inexpensive cooperative and 
contact programs during this transitional period when, rightly or wrongly, Greeks still 
have not got over sense of dependence on United States developed during past two 
decades and look to U.S. to push them into doing what they know they should.51  
 
 
While members of the country team were open to a covert operation, their proposed 
course of action was relatively mild; hardly a coup d’etat.  As the recently de-classified minutes 
of the National Security Council show, the operation would have cost $200,000 to $300,000.52  
Indeed, it was motivated, in part, by a desire to avert a coup—not to facilitate one.  As 
Ambassador Talbot wrote, “Upsurge of Andreas’ strength is deepening dichotomy in Greek 
public life to degree his incipient success might set off rightist counterrevolutionary attempts 
with prospectively adverse consequences for Greece and for the Alliance.  What we don’t need in 
NATO now is a Greek military dictatorship.”53   
The National Security Committee on Covert Action (the 303 Committee) concurred with 
the Embassy that “Andreas Papandreou had been observed for a sufficient period to realistically 
place him in a camp definitely hostile to U.S. interests.”54   But the 303 Committee asked: “Was 
the threat that great? . . .  Was it not possible that we were attributing more potential to Andreas 
than he deserved?”55  The matter was deferred largely to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who 
voted down the operation on the grounds that “the possible political gain is outweighed by the 
security risks.”56  Manipulation of the upcoming election was, therefore, expressly prohibited by 
the 303 Committee.57  It is inconceivable that the Johnson administration would have forbidden a 
relatively small-scale black operation but would have actively championed American 
involvement in a complex and large-scale measure such as a coup.58 
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Second, the junta leaders had connections to the American intelligence community, given 
the strong relationship that existed between the CIA and the KYP.  In fact, the American 
intelligence community had been monitoring a group of Greek military officers who were 
discontent with the political system and conspiring to overthrow democracy, if things did not 
improve to their liking.  Reports were being submitted to Washington that mentioned a possible 
coup could be staged by a group of officers known as the “Revolutionary Council.”59  The 
leaders of the Revolutionary Council just so happened to be some of the same officers that staged 
the coup of April 21, 1967.  The CIA’s reports on the Revolutionary Council, which numbered 
15 in total, started in June of 1965.60  No reports, however, were filed in the two months prior to 
the coup.61  Some commentators have speculated as to whether the break in reporting was a 
conscious effort by CIA agents to stop drawing attention to the coup plans, thus, making it 
difficult for officials to undermine the military takeover.62  Specifically, Robert Keeley has 
suggested: 
 
There is a possibility that one or more lower level people, particularly some Greek-
Americans who worked in the intelligence services, both military and civilian, knew 
about [the coup] in advance, because they were very sympathetic to the Colonels and 
their approach.  These staffers were very conservative, very anti-communist, fearful of 
the Papandreous regaining power; one might say even anti-democratic in some respects.  
It is possible that they knew about the Colonels’ plot and failed to report it either because 
they were cut off from their sources or because they colluded with the Colonels by not 
passing on information which would have enabled us to predict the coup.63   
 
While commentators have implied that the break in reporting points to American 
involvement in the conspiracy, alternative explanations exist.  For instance, the reports were 
sporadic to begin with.  It is not inconceivable that the next report would have been prepared in 
late April or early May, had the coup not taken place on April 21.64  It is also possible that the 
Colonels, fearing American resistance, went into “operational mode,” cutting communications 
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between themselves and the informant.65  John Maury has suggested that the failure to predict the 
Colonels’ coup was related to the decision to “isolate ourselves from any sources who might 
have tipped us off.”66  This instruction, coming from the Ambassador (with the support of the 
CIA Station Chief), was given in order to prevent curiosity about a possible coup—then heavily 
rumored to be in the works by the Generals—from being construed as “U.S. sympathy or 
support” for a military takeover.67  In addition, an intelligence cable filed on March 7, 1967, 
notes restlessness among military officers advocating a takeover.  Because one of the officers 
listed in this dispatch, Lt. Col. Georgios Papapdopoulos, was also a member of the 
“Revolutionary Council,” it is possible that American officials conflated the two groups and did 
not feel the need to file a separate report on just the Colonels.68  In short, awareness of the 
conspiratorial group, followed by a break in reporting, is hardly proof of American 
involvement—or even encouragement.   
That the United States had information on the Colonels, however, should come as no 
surprise.  The junta leaders did, after all, have working-level relationships with American 
officials.  For instance, the leader of the group, Lt. Col. Georgios “George” Papadopoulos, was 
reportedly the liaison officer between the KYP and the CIA, as well as the Director of Counter-
intelligence.69  Sworn testimony given to Greek judges following the fall of the Colonels in 1974 
alleged that “George Papadopoulos received a personal stipend from the American CIA agents 
and that he was the man through whom they [the CIA agents] paid stipends to the rest of the 
KYP employees.”70  According to Lawrence Wittner, Papadopoulos “had been on the CIA’s 
payroll since 1952.”71  Col. Nicholas Makerezos, moreover, was reportedly the head of the 
KYP’s information section on the night of the coup and Lt. Col. Michael Roufogalis was 
reportedly director of the KYP’s personnel section.72  Brig. Gen. Stelianos Pattakos, who had no 
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known contacts with the KYP, had been trained in the U.S. and was the only dictatorship leader 
who spoke English.73 Even Brig. Gen. Alexander Hadjipetros, although not associated with the 
KYP, was commandant of NATO’s missile-testing site on the Greek island of Crete.  According 
to Andreas Papandreou, this position “could be held only by men intimately associated with the 
American Military Mission and the CIA.”74  Thus, all of the junta’s leadership had known ties to 
the American security community. 
 The argument, however, that familiarity with someone makes you responsible for their 
actions is about as convincing as the argument that college professors are guilty for their 
students’ crimes.  The implication is that, because some American representatives had 
professional connections to the junta leaders, the United States must have had a role in staging 
the coup; guilt by association.  Alexis Papahelas goes so far as to speculate that, while “the 
records released so far do not contain documents confirming that the Papadopoulos group 
contacted the CIA for the U.S. ‘green light,’” the absence of a documentary connection “does not 
mean that an irregular communication of this kind did not occur, given that Papadopoulos and 
others maintained irregular but close contact with Greek-Americans serving in key posts in the 
CIA Station in Athens at the time.”75   
Looking beyond innuendo, John Maury has rebutted the allegations of a significant 
American connection to the junta:  
 
The brigadiers and colonels who thus found themselves in control were basically rather 
simple little men.  I had met some of them, including George Papadopoulos, who was the 
head of the junta, casually when they were middle-grade officers in KYP, the intelligence 
service which CIA had working-level liaison on matters of common concern, as with the 
intelligence services of all NATO countries. 
But none of the key junta members had any close connection with the Americans 
or experience in foreign policy or political activity.76 
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Robert Keeley has corroborated Maury’s claim: “we were working over-time trying to figure out 
who the Colonels were; no one knew them.  We had no bio-data on them; they didn’t speak 
English; they were not part of our military circles.  Only one had been trained in the United 
States. . . .  The other coup leaders had not been in the U.S.”77  Assuming all of these former 
American officials are not lying, it seems a stretch to argue that the U.S. government was behind 
the Colonels’ coup. 
Third, Andreas Papandreou cites the reaction of certain American elements in Greece as 
evidence of American complicity.  In a normal reaction to a coup, Papandreou suggested, the 
United States Military Mission in Greece would have “taken strong action,” fearing that the 
military intervention was a leftist putsch.78  The Mission, however, did not react in a forceful 
manner.  Papandreou speculated that the Mission’s response was indicative of prior knowledge.79  
Papandreou also alleges that the plan used to execute the coup was a modified version of NATO 
Plan Prometheus.  According to Andreas Papandreou: 
 
Originally designed to facilitate the suppression of the Communists and the fellow 
travelers within the country in case a Communist nation attacked from the north, 
[Prometheus] was revised shortly before the coup to deal with a strictly internal situation, 
independently of an attack from some other country.  And, though this has not been 
proved to date, the revision is said to have been carried out by a group of American 
colonels.80   
 
 
The U.S. not putting down the coup was the appropriate action.  Anything forceful would 
have been an overt interference in Greek politics—and a violation of Greece’s sovereignty.  
Given Washington’s previous admonishments to avoid interference in Greek politics, it is hard to 
imagine a scenario that would have justified an immediate (and obviously militaristic) reaction to 
quell the coup during the early hours of April 21, 1967.  As for the use of a NATO plan, the CIA 
Station Chief in Athens at the time concurred, characterizing Prometheus as “a NATO 
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contingency plan . . . designed to provide for military control in the event of war or revolution.”81  
It seems that Plan Prometheus was modified and then implemented to overthrow the Greek 
government.82  But, again, this is not indicative of American involvement.  Nor has proof of 
American assisted revisions ever surfaced.   
Clearly, the evidence—albeit circumstantial and questionable—indicates prior knowledge 
of a possible Colonels’ coup.  But where is the smoking gun?  Many American diplomats 
preferred to keep Andreas Papandreou out of power.  So motive was present.  But guilt should 
require action in addition to desire.  Did the U.S. actually do something to foment a Colonels’ 
dictatorship?  The Embassy advocated a covert operation.  The U.S. security community had ties 
to the Colonels.  And the U.S. presence in Greece did not act to put down the coup on April 21, 
1967 (which was likely executed pursuant to a modified NATO plan).  Yet, all of these factors 
are a far cry from American sponsorship of the coup.  Based on the evidence often cited to indict 
the U.S., it is clear that not only is there no smoking gun, but that the gun never even left the 
holster.  While hints of mens rea are present, evidence of actus reus does not even come close to 
meeting a preponderance of evidence standard, let alone a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  
Yet, for those not placated by the weakness of the often-cited evidence, there is exculpatory 
evidence which exonerates the U.S. from involvement in the overthrow of Greek democracy. 
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The Exculpatory Evidence 
“Η Αµερικη εβαλε τνν Χουντα.”  Translation: America installed the junta.   
The accusation is so nonchalantly made that it is easy to see how this claim has evolved 
into an accepted part of modern Greek history.  Still, this oft-repeated assertion has never been 
more than conjecture.  Because the relevant archival material from the U.S. State Department 
remained under lock and key till recent, it was extremely difficult to counter any arguments of 
American culpability for the 1967 coup.  Today, as the declassified memos, telegrams, and 
interviews show, there is a strong body of exculpatory evidence, from before and after the coup, 
to reject one of Greece’s strongest held conspiracy theories. 
 
Disapproval and Discouragement 
Let’s begin with exactly what the U.S. government knew.  As mentioned earlier, the Colonels 
were on the CIA’s radar screen as early as June 1965.  In fact, a de-classified field information 
report dated March 7, 1966, forewarned of a military plot to suspend democracy in Greece.  
Titled “Rightist Greek Military Conspiratorial Group,” the document identified many of the 
figures who would go on to govern Greece during its seven years of authoritarianism—including 
Georgios Papadopoulos.  The report noted that “The aims of this rightist group are to counter or 
avert leftist infiltration of the government and the military.”83  According to follow-up field 
information report, Papadopoulos had begun asserting that “if the political situation continues to 
deteriorate at the present rate, drastic action, i.e., dictatorship, will be needed.”84   
Following the release of FRUS XVI, several Greek commentators stated that the field 
information reports are evidence that “U.S. Government officials knew everything about 
Papadopoulos’s conspiratorial group.”85  The implication is that some American officials knew 
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when the coup was to have taken place.  A careful and unbiased reading of the report, however, 
indicates that there was no knowledge of when a Colonels’ coup would be launched.  As the 
December 20, 1966, field information report noted, “The group discussed the current political 
situation, but did not make a decision concerning the establishment of a dictatorship.”86  A later 
telegram, dated March 24, 1967, concluded: “there is no evidence that army leadership is 
actually plotting to create conditions leading to deviation from Constitution.  On contrary, we 
hold to opinion that military would not seek independently to impose a dictatorship, but it would 
support a dictatorship if King decided in favor of such a regime.”87  So, as late as March 24, 
1967, American officials believed that a coup—especially one led by a group of colonels acting 
without the blessings of the King—was not forthcoming; let alone certain. 
In the first few months of 1967, the United States was not ‘in the know’ of a concrete 
plan for the suspension of democracy.  Still, conspiracies were cooking and rumors were 
rampant.  The prevalent buzz in early 1967 was that the Generals would stage a coup in May, 
sponsored by the Palace, if a Papandreou electoral victory seemed inevitable.88  When such 
schemes were floated past them, American officials often took the opportunity to express their 
disapproval of any constitutional suspensions.  In January 1967, for instance, Dimitrios Bitsios, 
the Chief of the Royal Cabinet, asked John Maury, the CIA Station Chief, if the U.S. might be 
receptive to Palace-supported “extreme measures.”  Maury discouraged the idea:  
 
I said if he were speaking of unconstitutional measures, I was confident that U.S. reaction 
would be extremely unfavorable.  I pointed out that . . . unconstitutional measures rarely 
solve knotty political problems, and once such a course is embarked upon it is difficult to 
turn back.”89   
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Later in the meeting, Maury told Bitsios, “whatever justification might be found here for an 
unconstitutional solution, I saw no way in which it could be justified in the eyes of the American 
public, press or political leaders.”90 
In mid-March, there was a “flurry of rumors in press and elsewhere regarding . . . 
postponement of elections.”91  Even George Papandreou expressed “grave concern” and “fear” 
that a “junta might try to upset the plan for elections and to create the conditions for a 
dictatorship.”92  Meanwhile, a confidential informant was also reporting that “Lt. Gen. [Gregory] 
Spandidakis, Chief of Greek Army General Staff, has recently acted to prepare for 
implementation of Ierax (Hawk) 2, an alleged plan for military control of Greece.”93  Despite the 
buzz in the air of a coup, however, Ambassador Talbot was still optimistic that a coup was not 
likely: 
 
In our view, a plan probably does exist for certain actions by military in event of a 
dictatorship, but there is no evidence that army leadership is actually plotting to create 
conditions leading to deviation from Constitution.  On contrary, we hold to opinion that 
military would not seek independently to impose a dictatorship: but it would support a 
dictatorship if King decided in favor of such a regime.94 
 
Talbot concluded his cable by observing that “King, despite pressures by Right, wishes to avoid 
extremism.”95   
Less than a week later, Talbot’s optimism had given way to pessimism.  On March 29, 
the King directly informed Talbot that “he [King Constantine] cannot afford to risk the 
destruction of free Greece by permitting Andreas Papandreou to come to power.”96  Talbot 
informed the State Department, “From that conclusion, if he [King Constantine] should hold to 
it, there naturally would flow decisions ranging on the extreme.”97  Forecasting the mess to 
come, Talbot concluded, “As I say to my colleagues here: Well, chaps, we’re in it now!”98 
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All throughout the winter and early spring, Talbot and his staff were indicating their 
distaste for any suspension of democracy in Greece.  As DCM Norbert Anschuetz recalled, “The 
position of the Embassy was that a coup was not the proper solution to the problem.”99  Indeed, 
Talbot commented in a February cable, “What we don’t need in NATO now is a Greek military 
dictatorship.”100  The Ambassador expressed a similar view in his telegram of March 24:  
 
In our view, any effort by Palace and by Right to postpone elections could play right into 
hands of Andreas Papandreou and Left, unless it were carefully engineered to avoid 
appearance of direct involvement by King.  This, however, would be extremely difficult 
to accomplish.  Even more dangerous would be establishment of a dictatorship—a view 
that we have expressed to many Greek personalities, including King, over past several 
months.101  
 
By and large, Talbot had “in earlier talks . . . emphasized to the King our generally repugnant 
attitude toward dictatorships, citing our foot-dragging in recognizing the new Argentine regime.  
He is sufficiently aware of the general American posture.”102  But after the King personally 
floated the possibility of the Palace sponsoring a coup, Talbot decided to seek direct instruction 
from Washington on how to further proceed.  Washington advised the Embassy as follows: 
 
We would be inclined to warn more strongly against possible constitutional deviation.  
Depth of Greek feeling against such a move should be more carefully weighed by King.  
Andreas [Papandreou] as ‘martyr’ with Lambrakis machine standing fully behind him 
would be very formidable opponent.  As matter of principle, of course, U.S. would be 
opposed to extra-parliamentary move.  You should stress point that U.S. reaction to such 
move cannot be determined in advance but would depend on circumstances at time.103 
 
Pursuant to this guidance, Talbot met with the King.  As he reported, the King was 
discouraged from considering a coup as a feasible option to settle the brewing political crisis:  
 
I reassured him of continuing United States interest at highest level in Greece’s difficult 
situation.  I said we share his concern over policies that might be adopted by government 
with Andreas Papandreou as leading figure but believe certain restraints could operate to 
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keep such a government from at least some of extreme measures Andreas now 
advocating.  I expressed our agreement with the King’s hopes that current difficulties can 
be overcome through parliamentary processes.  I stated the inability of USG [U.S. 
Government] to give advance assurances of support to King and noted our traditional 
opposition to dictatorial solutions to constitutional crises.  They are wrong in principle 
and rarely work yet create many new difficulties.  A dictatorship in Greece might cause 
short-term upheavals, leading to more repressive measures, and to coalescence of 
opposition forces which in turn could be penetrated and dominated by international 
Communist agents.  Adverse international reactions would not be limited to the 
Communist apparatus but would include supporters of democracy.  Considerable 
criticism could be expected in United States.104 
 
 
On April 14, Talbot cautioned, “time has come to hoist urgent storm signals from 
Greece,” as the situation had “deteriorated into imminent danger of first-class mess leading 
country to brutal choice between dictatorship and Andreas Papandreou-led attacks on monarch 
and probably Greece’s foreign alignment.”105  The forecast was that the Center Union would 
“probably” emerge from the May 28th election with a “clear majority.”106  Talbot then opined: 
 
This wouldn’t be too bad if George Papandreou would emerge as boss.  At age 80, 
however, he’s lost biological race to his son Andreas, only other leader of vigor now in 
party, and a government with Andreas either as backstage manager or at helm would—as 
we evaluate thrust of his campaign—transform military high command into a party-
controlled instrument and thus effectively break authority of King and traditional 
influentials in this country.  United States would not necessarily find that and various 
domestic programs projected by Andreas so damaging except that they would give him 
springboard for foreign policies that sound like a Mediterranean Bhutto’s.  Comfortable 
and satisfactory Greek-U.S. relationship of past 20 years would inescapably yield to 
kinds of strains we are experiencing not only in Pakistan but in too many other countries.  
By all signs visible here, Russians would not be slow to take advantage. 
Fearing such consequences of adverse election results next month, coteries in 
Palace, armed forces and ERE are evidently building up steam for ‘constitutional 
deviation,’ meaning dictatorship.  They would hope to set things straight by period of 
firm rule and control of radicals.  While their script is unclear, we presume that after 
dissolution of Parliament, and probably in May if election prospects then look 
unfavorable to them, current ERE government would be transformed into an emergency 
government with, initially, civilian Ministers backed up by armed forces under orders of 
King.  Whether difficulties in enforcing order and meeting national problems would 
subsequently lead to direct army takeover is hard to perceive, as is method by which 
authoritarian rule would later make way for resumption of democratic government.107 
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Talbot concerned over the prospects of authoritarianism, which “would set Greece far 
back domestically and internationally and in end might not save either monarchy or Western 
orientation,” then requested immediate advice on how to proceed with “looming dangers.”108  
The answer came within hours of the coup.  In an effort to avoid an overthrow of democracy, the 
State Department proposed a compromise between the King and George Papandreou which 
would protect the King’s interests following a Center Union victory in the upcoming election.109 
Talbot, though, never had an opportunity to pitch Washington’s solution for averting a 
showdown.  On April 21, the Colonels orchestrated a suspension to democratic rule in Greece. 
The evidence from the period before the coup clearly and convincingly shows that, while 
the U.S. was well aware of the possibility of a dictatorial scheme, diplomats in Greece, acting 
under the guidance of superiors back in Washington, consistently discouraged extra-
constitutional measures.110  Had the U.S. government sponsored the 1967 coup, the archival 
material would not only contain foreknowledge of the April 21 plot, it would also be filled with 
evidence of American encouragement and assistance.   
 
Surprise and Scorn 
The Colonels’ coup caught American officials by surprise.111  As John Maury recalled, “the plan 
was carried out to the letter, completely surprising the palace, the senior military commanders, 
the chiefs of the Greek intelligence and police services—and the Americans.”112  The sense that 
Americans were caught off-guard is reflected in early telegrams.  Ambassador Talbot’s initial 
report to Washington observed, “On basis [of] still fragmentary information I have formed 
tentative impression that coup was triggered this morning by small army group not including 
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High Command, King or civilian political leaders.”113  By the end of the night, Talbot had 
concluded that, even though, the “real power rests with military.  Question is which military.”114 
Had the United States known of the April 21 plot, details of the executors and their 
justifications would have been immediately dispatched to Washington.  Yet, even after meeting 
with two of the regime’s new civilian leaders and hearing their raison d'être, the Embassy was 
still reporting “there remain so many gaps in our understanding of what has happened and 
why.”115  It took over 48 hours to compile the first informative report on members of the junta 
and their possible motivations.116  In the weeks that followed, the Embassy continued to report 
additional fragments of information back to the State Department, further indicating that the 
Johnson administration was in the dark as to the Colonels’ plan.117 
While surprise is one theme that runs through most of the reporting from the first two 
weeks of the junta period, the other theme is moderate scorn for the new regime.  Immediately, 
the decision was made to support the King.  And it was clear from the first moments of the coup 
that the junta did not have the blessings of the Palace.  As an April 21 cable notes, the new 
government “was forced upon” the King.118  The same cable reported: “King Constantine, 
blazingly angry, has just told me that neither he nor General officers control Greek army tonight.  
‘Incredibly stupid ultra-rightwing bastards, having gained control of tanks, have brought disaster 
to Greece,’ he said.”119  Indeed, so livid was the King that he literally “contemplated shooting 
perpetrators when they came to Palace to be sworn in.”120 
One of the first policy decisions taken by the Ambassador was to establish an emergency 
communications line with the Palace and to prepare for the possible evacuation of the Royal 
Family.  The other major decision made on April 21 was to meet with the civilian leaders of the 
new regime and to admonish them that: 
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[W]e look to the government to maintain order, we insist that they open up 
communications for stranded Americans and call strongly upon government to restore 
normal life as rapidly as possible.  With all force we call upon government to protect 
detainees from physical harm, and I will assert that United States, which gives Greece 
much assistance, will watch developments minutely.  I will also express our support for 
role of King as Chief of State.121 
 
Later that evening, Ambassador Talbot called on the appointed Prime Minister, Constantine 
Kollias, and informed him of the United States’ concerns.  In addition, the new Greek leadership 
was cautioned that the United States was “deeply distressed by today’s developments, including 
the use of American-furnished equipment to overthrow the constitutional government of 
Greece.”122 
The day after this initial encounter, Talbot cabled Washington and advised that “our 
public and press posture [should] reveal our regret and our distaste for process of changing 
governments by military coups.”123  The response from the State Department was one of general 
concurrence, emphasizing continuing support for the King vis-à-vis the military regime.124  The 
overall tenor of policy guidance was that the United States might be willing to work with the 
new government, but that American actions would follow the King’s lead and be dependent on a 
reduction in the “extensive security measures now in force.”125 
Two days after the military takeover, Ambassador Talbot was reporting:  
 
Until now Embassy . . . has coldly pointed out American reaction to overthrow of 
parliamentary government of a NATO ally by military establishment trained and 
equipped by Americans.  We have been all but rude to Spandidakis [the new regime’s 
Deputy Prime Minister] and others in cross-examining their assertions that they and other 
properly constituted commanders are actually in control of army.  Without predicting 
what policy lines United States might adopt we have spelled out possible consequences in 
short words.  We have made sure arrival of Sixth Fleet task force group in Greek waters 
has not gone unnoticed by top people.  If we haven’t educated the mule, at least we have 
given it those knocks required to get its attention.126 
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The dispatch continued: “Now that we have its attention, what do we say?  From our vantage 
point here, what is essential is to get Greece pointed again in direction of some kind of 
government with consent of governed. . . .  [A]vowed steps toward restoration of constitutional 
rule would give promise of way out from present dictatorial deadend.”127 
On April 24, the State Department informed the Embassy that American military 
assistance to Greece was being suspended in response to the Greek military’s suspension of 
democracy.  Washington counseled, “we should follow a policy of watchful waiting, and an 
attitude of coolness towards new govt while encouraging King vigorously to support move 
towards more viable government.”128  Talbot, following this guidance, met with the King and 
told him, “we remain exceedingly uncomfortable at having Greek ally under military 
dictatorship.”129  Talbot explained, “Americans would find it extremely difficult during this 
period to deliver tanks and similar major weaponry to regime which has used American-made 
tanks to overthrow established government.”130   
The junta, nonetheless, started consolidating its power through anti-democratic and 
repressive measures.  Talbot warned Washington: 
 
We are concerned about internal political implications of current situation and its impact 
on long term US position here. . . .  It is difficult predict how much time may elapse 
before leftist and militantly democratic elements of population recover from shock and 
reaction sets in.  Tenor of broadcasts from bloc radios suggests Communists may 
consider that coup provides them unexpected opportunity to enhance their position in 
Greece.  A large number of Greeks believe United States concurred in or tolerated coup.  
Many Greeks assert only Communists dispose of an organization capable of leading 
resistance against a dictatorship and warn that Communists must not again be permitted 
to become leaders of democratic resistance as in World War II.131 
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Realizing the pitfalls of the Greek military regime, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
capitalized on an opportunity during a NATO Defense Ministers meeting to administer a high-
level scolding.  He admonished Deputy Prime Minister Spandidakis: 
 
[I]t concerns us greatly that Greece has moved away from constitutional processes. . . . 
[T]he American people could never understand a statement that there is more 
democracy today than before April 21—with the press suppressed, assembly prevented, 
people restrained, no free speech, and other constitutional guarantees suspended.  Also, 
important to the view by the American people was the absence of any schedule for 
resumption of constitutional processes.  These . . . are strong feelings of most of the 
people in the US. . . .  [I]t would be extraordinarily difficult to maintain the Greek 
military assistance program without modification if there is no acceptable time schedule 
for the resumption of constitutional processes. . . . 
[T]he Greeks should not underestimate the concern of the US and the strong 
hopes for movement back toward constitutional processes. . . . 
[T]he whole Greek situation is dangerous, and that, until action is taken to remedy 
it, the dangerous situation will continue. . . .  [T]he greatest deterrent to the Soviets and 
the thing most likely to encourage support from the US would be a demonstration by the 
Greeks that they can return to constitutional processes.132 
 
The logic behind the conspiracy theory of American culpability in the Colonels’ coup 
requires that, if the U.S. government had been behind the military intervention, then the U.S. 
would have been ‘in the know’ and would have been warmly receptive to the new regime.  But 
the newly released documents point in the other direction.  As reflected in an April 22 telegram, 
the initial views of American officials were well captured by Talbot, who described the previous 
day as “the day of the rape of Greek democracy.”133  As Talbot added, “I am certain that Greece 
will long rue this day’s events, whose long range effects are hard to foresee.”134 
 
 28
Conclusion 
As Talbot predicted, to this day, many rue the events of April 21.  Moreover, many resent those 
responsible for the events of that historic date in Greek history.135  As the evidence above shows, 
however, the U.S. government is not guilty for the tragedy of April 21.  The United States 
discouraged conspirators who suggested a military takeover might be the solution to Greece’s 
political crisis in the mid-1960s.  The United States had no foreknowledge of the Colonels’ plot 
specifics.  And the United States, once presented with the coup as fait accompli, expressed 
disdain for the overthrow of democracy.  Combined, these facts not only weaken the case of 
conspiracy theorists, they exonerate the Johnson administration. 
The belief that the United States helped stage the Colonels’ coup has been a source of 
bitterness for over three decades—leading to heated debates, anti-Americanism, and even 
violence and terrorism in Greece.  Arguably, the Nixon administration—which was far more 
supportive of the Papadopoulos government than the Johnson administration—deserves some 
blame for these consequences.  But as for the question of were the eagle and the phoenix birds of 
feather?  Well, if they were, they did not take flight together until after April 21, 1967. 
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not defiant policies.  However, Andreas strikes me as capable in adversity of dismantling 
traditional Greek institutions and policies if he is permitted to do so and to lead country even 
deeper into Nasserist posture.”  Ibid. 
109“Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece,” Washington, 
April 20, 1967, FRUS XVI, Document No. 272.  Washington’s solution was “compromise based 
on iron-clad assurances from both sides.  Our formula would envision assurance from King to G. 
Papandreou that Andreas Papandreou would not be arrested, in return for following two 
concessions from Papandreou, on assumption he wins May 28 elections: (1) that he appoint only 
persons of ‘mutual confidence’ to sensitive positions of Foreign Affairs and Defense and (2) that 
he not carry out widespread shakeup in armed forces leadership.”  Ibid.  As this proposal implies, 
the State Department felt that political problems in Greece could be resolved even if the 
Papandreous won the upcoming elections, so long as both sides were open to some political 
compromise.  Such an attitude shows no desire in Washington to take active measures against the 
Papandreous.  The obvious implication is that Washington dissented with proposals for a coup. 
110The recollection of Herbert Daniel Brewster is consistent with this interpretation: “we 
knew that the generals might have come up, we used all our influence in terms of telling them, 
‘no, this is not the answer; coups are not the way to go, you are a member of NATO,’ etc. etc.  I 
presume that they took heed of it but along came this undercover upstart type and he just ran the 
ball.”  Herbert Daniel Brewster, oral history interview, FAOHC.   
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the Colonels overthrow democracy in Greece, its focus is on events prior to and including April 
21, 1967.  Nevertheless, as immediate American reactions to the coup also shed light on the 
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added, “When the question of a possible military coup did arise, it was always in the context of a 
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soon as possible.  The possibility of such a move by the rigid, fanatical colonels was never 
seriously considered.”  Maury’s insistence that the coup was a bolt from the blue has been 
corroborated by numerous other American officials.  See, for example, FAOHC oral history 
interviews with Herbert Daniel Brewster, Norbert L. Anschuetz, John P. Owens, August Velletri, 
and Ambassador Robert V. Keeley. 
113“Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State,” Athens, April 21, 
1967, FRUS XVI, Document No. 273.  In a subsequent cable sent later in the day, it was noted 
that “Emb[assy] had been following situation as closely as we could but that our information still 
extremely limited by inaccessibility of persons involved, fact telephonic communications had 
been cut, and that circulation in city had been prohibited.”  “Telegram from the Embassy in 
Greece to the Department of State,” Athens, April 21, 1967, FRUS XVI, Document No. 274. 
114“Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State,” Athens, April 21, 
1967, FRUS XVI, Document No. 276.  Cables sent out that first day also portray an Embassy 
staff concerned with the whereabouts and conditions of political prisoners.  As one dispatch 
states, “Ambassador has in fact instructed all official American representatives . . . to emphasize 
that bloodshed will make an already tragically complicated situation infinitely more so.” 
“Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State,” Athens, April 21, 1967, 
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officials been aware of the Colonels’ plans, they would have probably spent far less time 
scrambling for information on prisoners and admonishing Greek authorities as to the treatment of 
their detainees. 
115“Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State,” Athens, April 22, 
1967, FRUS XVI, Document No. 277.   
116“Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State,” Athens, April 23, 
1967, FRUS XVI, Document No. 279.  This telegram noted: “Coup is revolutionary.  Its central 
core—Papadopoulos, described as the top theoretician; Patakos, the top executive; and 
Makerezos—are limited, politically inexperienced, tough-minded, no-nonsense types setting out 
to ‘purify’ Greek political, social and economic life.  Their manifesto sounds like Ayub in 1958.  
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Also like 1958 model Ayub, they declare themselves thousand percent pro-American and are 
urgently seeking any hint of American understanding of what they’re doing. With or without it, 
they know they must succeed or lose their heads.”  Ibid.  The telegram also speculated as to the 
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